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ABSTRACT
In Alaska, a third-party custodian is frequently required as a condition of
pretrial release. Under this system, a defendant must provide a third party, to
be approved by a judge, who will agree to stay with the defendant and take
responsibility for the defendant’s appearance in court. In this Note, the
Author critiques Alaska’s use of the third-party custodian requirement. First,
she explains the constitutional and statutory requirements that regulate
pretrial release. Next, she examines the past and present usage of pretrial
release in Alaska, focusing on the original rationale behind the third-party
custodian requirements and the impact that the third-party custodian
requirement has on defendants. Ultimately, the Author proposes that Alaska
develop an independent pretrial services agency that would enable judges to
make more effective bail decisions by providing them with relevant
information.
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INTRODUCTION
If you are charged with a felony in Alaska, it is likely that before
you will be released on bail you will need to find a person or
organization willing to supervise you for twenty-four hours a day.1 This
person2 must be approved by a judicial officer, which means that he or
she cannot have a recent criminal record, must have a home where you
can also live, and must otherwise appear responsible enough to report
you if you violate the conditions of your release.3 While most state
statutes allow courts to place defendants in the custody of a person or

1. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY PROCESS: 1999 116 (Feb. 2004)
[hereinafter ALASKA FELONY PROCESS], available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/
reports/Fel99FullReport.pdf.
2. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(b)(1) (2008). The statute can be interpreted to
allow more than one third-party custodian. Though many judges will approve
more than one custodian, they may be hesitant to allow a defendant to have
multiple third-party custodians because of the risk that the third parties will lose
track of who is responsible for watching the defendant at what time. See On the
other hand, judicial officers occasionally, either deliberately or accidentally, will
approve a single third-party custodian for multiple defendants. Release of a
Criminal Defendant: Hearing on H.R. 368 Before the Judiciary H. Comm., 21st Leg.
Reg. Sess., no. 1750 (Alaska Feb. 25, 2000) (comment by Lauree Hugonin,
Director, Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault).
3. Judicial officers have broad authority to impose various conditions of
release on defendants. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.30.020(b)(1)–(6) (2008). Additionally,
(b)(7) is a catchall provision allowing judicial officers to “impose any other
condition considered reasonably necessary to assure the defendant’s appearance
as required and the safety of the alleged victim, other persons, or the
community.”
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organization,4 the practice is not used as much elsewhere in the
country.5 In Alaska this is called the third-party custodian condition of
pretrial release. It is an onerous requirement that is not being used for its
intended purpose. Most people working in the criminal justice system
agree that too many defendants are required to have a third-party
custodian, and that the third-party custodian system usually fails to
serve its intended purpose.6
The Alaska bail statute is plainly written to create a presumption of
personal-recognizance release.7 If a judicial officer finds that personalrecognizance is not appropriate because of concerns that the defendant
will fail to appear at future court dates or that he poses a threat to the
community’s safety, then, and only then, can the judicial officer impose
further conditions of release upon the defendant.8 However, the
conditions of release must only be those that the judicial officer
reasonably believes are necessary to ensure the defendant’s appearance
and the safety of the community.9 As will be shown, the third-party
condition of release so burdens the defendant, as well as his family and
friends, that its use should be decreased. This heavy burden should be
considered every time the third-party custodian condition is imposed.
When a defendant is required to find a third-party custodian before
he can be released on bail, he will likely spend more time in
predisposition incarceration than he would without the third-party

4. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3967(E)(1) (2001); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/110-10(b)(13)(2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276 § 58 (2002); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 544.455 (1)(1)(2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-534(a)(3) (2009); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-123(A)(1) (2008).
5. Antonia Moras, The Felony Case Process in Alaska: The Judicial Council
Analysis, Alaska Justice Forum (2004); see also Joseph Van De Mark, Supervisor,
Office of Public Advocacy, Remarks at the Review of Bail Reviews Public Forum
(Sept. 16, 2008) (summary of Public Comment on file with author).
6. John Novak, Department of Labor, Remarks at the Review of Bail
Reviews Public Forum (Sept. 16, 2008) (summary of Public Comment on file
with author); see also comments at the same Public Forum by John Murtaugh,
criminal defense attorney; Adrienne Backman, Anchorage District Attorney; Bill
Miller, Anchorage Police Department; Rex Butler, criminal defense attorney;
Marjorie Allard, Pub. Defender Agency; and Ben Hofmeister, Anchorage District
Attorney. But see Malcolm Roberts, Remarks at the Review of Bail Reviews
Public Forum (Sept. 16, 2008) (arguing that the third-party custodian
requirement does work in some instances).
7. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(a) (2008). Under a “personal recognizance
release,” the court “takes the defendant’s word that he or she will appear for a
scheduled matter . . . . ” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1054 (8th ed. 2004).
8. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(b) (2008).
9. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.30.020(a), (b)(7) (2008).
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requirement.10 This is problematic because studies clearly show that
increased pretrial incarceration often leads to higher conviction rates
and longer sentences for the same crimes.11 Longer pre-disposition
incarceration rates raise constitutional questions because a defendant is
legally presumed innocent and has a right to bail.12 Furthermore,
incarcerating defendants merely because they cannot find a third-party
custodian is an added expense to the State, and exacerbates the problem
of prison overcrowding in Alaska.13 When an accused is incarcerated
before trial, he is unable to be as helpful to his attorney in preparing his
defense and in helping with any pretrial investigations.14 In addition,
incarcerated individuals typically have lower morale and less energy to
fight the charges against them.15 This has caught the attention of the
Alaska Legislature,16 though at the time of publication no legislation to
change the third-party custodian requirement had been introduced.
The bail system must be overhauled to protect accused individuals
who have a constitutional right to be released before trial17 with added
statutory protection providing that any conditions of release must be the
least restrictive means possible to ensure both the defendant’s
appearance at future court hearings and the safety of the community.18
Part I of this Note examines the current pretrial release statutes in
Alaska and the State’s current practices regarding bail. Part II explores
the statutory history of the bail statute and the historical use of thirdparty custodians, and argues that what began as an avenue for
providing pretrial release for indigent defendants is now being used as a

10. See infra Part I.B. (describing a study by the Alaska Judicial Council
regarding the effects of the third-party custodian condition on incarceration
rates).
11. See id.
12. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11. This section contains an exception allowing
judicial officers to hold defendants in pretrial detention without bail if they have
been accused of a crime punishable by death. However, since no crimes are
punishable by death in Alaska, the exception is currently moot. See H.R. 9, 26th
Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2009).
13. TERI CARNS, ET AL., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT OF THE
ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASSESSMENT COMMISSION 20 (2000) (the prison
population in 1999 exceeded the State’s capacity by approximately 2400 people).
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. Id.
16. See Criminal Law/Sentencing/Probation/Parole: Hearing on H.R. 244 Before the
H. Judiciary Standing Comm., 23d Cong. at 31 (Alaska Apr. 7, 2004) (the House
Judiciary Standing Committee adopted a letter of intent that judicial officers,
when making bail decisions, should consider the purpose of bail statutes of
allowing bail to indigent defendants); id. at 51–55 (the House Judiciary Standing
Committee unanimously agreed that third-party custodians are used too often).
17. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11.
18. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (2008).
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regular condition of release, thereby stifling defendants’ rights to equal
protection under the laws. Finally, Part III recommends reforms to bail
practice in Alaska. In particular, it advocates that Alaska develop a
pretrial services program whose employees will interview defendants
and make impartial bail recommendations to judicial officers prior to the
defendants’ arraignment. The employees could also serve supervisory
roles to monitor defendants during pretrial release and to remind them
of future court dates. Pretrial services offices already operate around the
country and have proven enormously successful at effectively reforming
pretrial release practices.19

I. PRETRIAL RELEASE: LAWS AND PRACTICES
A.

Requirements Under Alaska Law

1. Constitutional Requirements
Bail in Alaska is regulated pursuant to the United States
Constitution,20 the Alaska Constitution,21 Alaska State Statutes,22 and the
Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure.23 The Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution reads: “Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”24 In Stack v. Boyle,25 the Supreme Court defined excessive bail
as an amount that is above and beyond what is “reasonably calculated”
to ensure the presence of the accused at pretrial court hearings.26 In
Stack, twelve people were accused of conspiring to commit an illegal act
of fraud against the United States under the Smith Act.27 All defendants
were required to post bail bonds before their release from prison, but the
19. See BARRY MAHONEY, ET AL., PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND POTENTIAL, ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8
(National Institute of Justice, Washington D.C.) (2001) (as of publication in 2001
there were pretrial services programs operating in 300 counties in the United
States and in all of the districts in the Federal Court system); id. at vi (“Welldesigned and well-managed pretrial services programs have the potential to
help justice systems function more fairly and more effectively for all citizens.”).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
21. ALASKA CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 12.
22. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30 (2008).
23. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 41.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
25. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
26. Id. at 4–5 (“The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the
accused’s giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to
sentence if found guilty. . . . Bail set at a figure higher than an amount
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth
Amendment.”).
27. See id. at 3.
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bond amounts varied greatly, from $2500 to $100,000.28 Petitioners
challenged the bail amounts on the grounds that they were excessive.29
The Court held that bail was excessive as applied to some of the
defendants because it was set above the normal bail based on the crime,
and the State provided no evidence as to why a higher bail was
necessary for those particular defendants to ensure their future presence
in court.30
The Alaska Constitution contains the same language found in the
United States Constitution.31 The Alaska Constitution also guarantees
the right of every accused to be released on bail pending trial, unless he
or she is accused of a capital offense, “when the proof is evident or the
presumption great.”32 Since Alaska currently does not recognize any
crimes as punishable by death, the exception to the right to bail does not
currently apply to any defendants in the State.33 The right of defendants
to be released before trial is not one recognized by the United States
Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Carlson v. Landon.34
The United States Supreme Court in Carlson was asked to interpret the
Eighth Amendment to include an enumerated right for all defendants to
be released on bail pending trial.35 The Court declined to do so,
reasoning that the language in the Eighth Amendment was lifted from
the English Bill of Rights Act and that the clause had been interpreted in
England as applying only to cases where it was appropriate to grant
bail, but not necessarily to every case.36 Pretrial detention remains
standard practice in the federal criminal system.37

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 5 (“[T]he fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based
upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that
defendant.”). The current federal bail statute, as amended in 1988, along with
most state statutes, supra note 4, require that judicial officers also set bail to
ensure the safety of the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (2006).
31. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12. This section of the Alaska Constitution states,
in addition to the language found in the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, that “Criminal administration shall be based upon the following:
the need for protecting the public, community condemnation of the offender, the
rights of victims of crimes, restitution from the offender, and the principle of
reformation.” Id.
32. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11.
33. The “capital offense” exception may become more relevant in the future,
as legislation introduced in the 2009 Alaska legislative session would reinstate
the death penalty for some murder offenses. H.R. 9, 26th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska
2009).
34. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
35. Id. at 544.
36. Id. at 545.
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006).
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In Alaska, the right to bail is absolute.38 The Alaska Supreme Court,
however, has made clear that this does not guarantee every defendant
the right to have bail set at an amount that he or she can afford.39 The
ability of a defendant to pay is a factor considered by the judicial officer
responsible for setting bail, but an inability to pay does not necessarily
entitle a defendant to have his or her bail decreased.40
2. Statutory Requirements
Bail procedures are further regulated by statute41 and by Rule 41 of
the Alaska Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.42 The statutory language
creates a presumption that a defendant should be released on his own
recognizance, unless charged with a Class A or unclassified felony.43
However, if the judicial officer setting bail determines that the defendant
poses a danger to the community or is a flight risk, then the officer can
impose conditions of release that are “reasonably necessary” to ensure
the community’s safety or the defendant’s appearance in court.44 The
statute lists various conditions of release that the judicial officer shall
consider, including a catch-all provision allowing the judicial officer to
impose any restriction that he believes will reasonably ensure the
community’s safety and the defendant’s appearance.45 The remaining
enumerated conditions of release include different types of bonds to
address both appearance and performance concerns; restrictions on
travel, association, and living arrangements; and lastly, what has come
to be known as the third-party custodian requirement.46 Under this
requirement, “[t]he judicial officer may . . . place the person in the
38. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11.
39. See Reeves v. State, 411 P.2d 212, 214 (Alaska 1966) (“We hold that an
indigent defendant does not have an absolute right to pretrial release on his own
recognizance.”); Fesolai v. State, No. A-10169 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2008)
(“[U]nder Alaska law, indigent defendants have no right to demand that the
court set monetary bail in an amount that they can post.”) (citing Gilbert v. State,
540 P.2d 485, 486 n.12 (Alaska 1975)).
40. Reeves, 411 P.2d at 212.
41. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30 (2008).
42. ALASKA. R. CRIM. P. 41.
43. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(a) (2008) (“A person charged with an offense
shall . . . be ordered released pending trial on the person’s personal recognizance
. . . unless the offense is an unclassified felony or class A felony or unless the
officer determines that the release of the person will not reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required or will pose a danger to the alleged victim,
other persons, or the community.”).
44. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(b)(7) (2008). The enumerated conditions of
release include various types of bonds, restrictions on travel, association, and
living arrangements, and allow the person to be placed in the “custody of a
designated person or organization . . . .” ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(b)(1) (2008).
45. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(b)(7) (2008).
46. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(b)(1)–(6) (2008).
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custody of a designated person or organization agreeing as a custodian
to supervise the person.”47 Identical or substantially similar language
appears in the statutes of thirty-three additional states and Washington,
D.C.,48 but the practice is not used elsewhere with the same frequency as
it is in Alaska.49
If a person “remains in custody 48 hours after appearing before a
judicial officer because of inability to meet the conditions of release,” he
is “entitled to have the conditions reviewed” by a judicial officer.50 Upon
review, if the judicial officer declines to change the conditions imposed
(meaning the defendant will likely remain in custody), then the judicial
officer is required to “set out in writing the reasons for requiring the
conditions imposed.”51 After this second review, the person in custody
does not have an absolute right to another bail review.52 However, after
another week, if the detained individual can demonstrate that “new
information not considered at the previous review will be presented,”
and gives the prosecuting attorney forty-eight hours notice, he can
request another bail review.53
B.

Current Pretrial Release Practices

Despite the fact that many states have the same or similar language
in their bail statutes allowing courts to place defendants in the custody
of another person or organization, the third-party custodian condition of
release is imposed more often in Alaska than in other states. In Alaska
this condition of pretrial release was initially thought to provide
protection for indigent defendants by giving them access to pretrial
release with little or no monetary bail.54 Instead, imposing a third-party
custodian has become the norm in some Alaskan jurisdictions for all
types of defendants, and this imposition is often coupled with the

47. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(b)(1) (2008).
48. See supra note 4.
49. See generally Van De Mark, supra note 5.
50. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(f) (2008).
51. Id.
52. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(j) (2008).
53. Id. All requirements that the defendant must meet for a subsequent
review can be waived by the prosecuting attorney. Id. Also, if the defendant “has
been incarcerated for a period equal to the maximum sentence for the most
serious charge for which the defendant is being held,” he can request an
immediate bail review. Id.
54. See infra Part II.A (describing that the initial theory behind the thirdparty custodian requirement was that more people could be released without
posting a financial bond if judges were able to release them to the custody of
another citizen or an organization).
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requirement that the defendant also post significant monetary bail.55
Some judicial officers impose the condition simply as added insurance
that the defendant will follow his conditions of release, and often the
implications of that decision are not carefully considered.56
In 1997, the Advisory Committee to the Alaska Supreme Court on
Fairness and Access57 issued a report concluding that there was a
perception among legal practitioners “that the criminal justice process
[in Alaska] is unfair to minorities.”58 The Committee recommended that
the Alaska Judicial Council59 conduct a study of the criminal justice
system to determine whether minorities were in fact being treated
unfairly on account of their race.60 The Council followed the
Committee’s recommendation and broadened its scope to include an
investigation of whether there were other “unwanted disparities” in the
criminal justice system in Alaska, such as whether the system was
biased based on gender, location, or the defendant’s type of attorney.61
Its report is the only comprehensive study of release practices available
and as such is relied on heavily in this Note.
The Council focused its study on felony cases filed in 1999 only.62
About 2300 cases were selected, representing about two-thirds of those
filed.63 Of the people charged with a felony in 1999 whose cases were
examined, 54% statewide were required to have a third-party
custodian.64 In some geographic areas, the requirement was imposed
much more frequently than in others. In Dillingham, for example, 95%
of felony defendants were required to have third-party custodians,
55. See ALASKA FELONY PROCESS, supra note 1, at 75 (“The requirement for a
third party custodian usually was in addition to the requirement for monetary
bail.”).
56. Telephone Interview with a District Court Judge, State of Alaska Dist. Ct.
(Feb. 3, 2009). All of the judges interviewed for this Note requested anonymity
and are thus distinguished by date of interview and court. This judge was very
frank about the use of third-party custodians in the judge’s court solely for the
purpose of supervising the defendant’s other conditions of release.
57. This committee was created in 1995 by the Alaska Supreme Court.
ALASKA FELONY PROCESS, supra note 1, at 4.
58. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, REPORT OF THE ALASKA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON FAIRNESS AND ACCESS 25, 43 (1997).
59. The Alaska Judicial Council is a commission of three attorneys, three
non-attorneys, and the Chief Justice of the Alaska Supreme Court, and was
created by the Alaska Constitution to “conduct studies for improvement of the
administration of justice, and make reports and recommendations to the
supreme court and to the legislature at intervals of not more than two years,”
among other duties assigned by law. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 8–9.
60. ALASKA FELONY PROCESS, supra note 1, at 1.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 23.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 116 fig.24.
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while in Kotzebue the figure was only 35%.65 Furthermore, 44% of those
defendants released to a third-party custodian also posted some type of
monetary bond in order to be released before trial.66 Conversely, 60% of
the defendants who posted a monetary bond were also required to have
a third-party custodian.67
Overall, the Council reported that the Alaskan justice system is not
biased based on unwanted factors.68 However, the Council found that
“[t]he requirement for a third-party custodian was one of the most
important influences on the length of time that defendants spent
incarcerated before the disposition of their cases.”69 The Council
compared many different characteristics with the amount of time that a
defendant remained in jail before his case was finally resolved.70
Considering predisposition incarceration rates in relation to the type of
offense, the third-party custodian requirement was the only factor “that
was significantly associated with an estimated change in predisposition
incarceration days for every type of offense.”71 When pretrial
incarceration is considered for all offenses combined as a statewide
average, defendants with the third-party custodian requirement spent
eighteen additional days incarcerated, compared to defendants without
the third-party custodian requirement.72 For drug offenses, this
increased to twenty-five additional days incarcerated, and six more
additional days for violent offenses.73 In the Anchorage area, when all
offenses were combined, a defendant with a third-party custodian
requirement spent an additional twenty-two days incarcerated.74
Examining only sexual offenses, the difference rose to an additional
fifty-five days incarcerated.75 This finding was unexpected and led to the
Judicial Council’s recommendation that the third-party custodian
requirement be reviewed to determine its effectiveness.76

65. Id. The rates vary in different communities throughout Alaska: Unalaska,
80%; Kenai, 70%; Valdez, 68%; Kodiak, 62%; Anchorage, 58%; Juneau, 55%;
Bethel, 45%; Nome, 42%; Fairbanks, 41%; and Homer, 36%. Id.
66. Id. at 75.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 3. Data were collected by the Council from a number of different
sources “about defendant’s characteristics, the nature of the charges and court
processes, the type of attorney, and the outcomes of each case.” Id. at 5.
69. Id. at 176–77.
70. Id. at 52.
71. Id. at 176.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 179 tbl.35b.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 284 (“The court system and other agencies should review
predisposition practices in other communities and states to determine whether
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II. ORIGINALLY ANOTHER MECHANISM TO ENSURE EQUAL
PROTECTION FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, NOW DISCRIMINATES
AGAINST THEM
A.

Statutory History of Section 12.30.020 of the Alaska Statutes,
Release Before Trial

Shortly after the United States Congress passed the Bail Reform Act
of 1966,77 a bill was introduced in the Alaska Legislature78 to replace all
previous bail statutes.79 This bill was “taken almost exactly from a
congressional bill to revise existing bail practices in United States
courts.”80 This statute was a drastic change from previous statutes
because it emphasized non-financial release conditions.81 The Report of
the Alaska House Judiciary includes an excerpt from the Congressional
record stating that this new bail legislation will “assure that all persons,
regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending
their appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal, when
detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest[.]”82
On February 7, 1966, the bill passed the Alaska State House of
Representatives, twenty-seven to one.83 The bill passed in the Senate,
seventeen to one, on February 24, 1966.84 Part of the original statute as
passed in 1966 reads as follows:
(a) A person charged with an offense shall, at his first
appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released
pending trial on his personal recognizance or upon the
execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount
specified by the judicial officer unless the officer
determines that the release of the person will not
less restrictive practices can protect the public and ensure the appearance of
defendants . . . effectively.”).
77. Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
3144 (2006)).
78. H.B. 317, 4th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1966).
79. H.R. 4-317, 2d Sess., at 110 (Alaska 1966). In this report, the House
Judiciary Committee explained that “present law contains four sections on bail
for persons accused of crimes (ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.30.010–12.30.040 (2008)) and
two sections on release of material witnesses (ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.50.090–
12.50.100 (2008)).” Alaska House Bill 317 “replaces that law with a detailed
procedure for release of accused persons and material witnesses.” Id.
80. Id. (citing Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 3144 (2006))).
81. See H.B. 317, 4th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1966).
82. H.R. 4-317, 2d. Sess., at 110–11 (Alaska 1966) (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 136.
84. Id. at 260.
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reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required.
(b) If a judicial officer determines under (a) of this section that
the release of a person will not reasonably assure the
appearance of the person, the judicial officer may
(1) Place the person in the custody of a designated person
or organization agreeing to supervise him . . . .85
In 1967, the Alaska Legislature amended section 12.30.020 of the
Alaska Statutes to include provisions requiring that the judicial officer
setting bail consider whether the defendant “will pose a danger to other
persons and the community.”86 Shortly after these amendments, the
State attempted to hold defendants with no bail on the basis “that these
amendments permit the detention of defendants without bail when the
judicial officer determines that the defendant ‘will pose a danger to
other persons and the community.’”87 However, the Alaska Supreme
Court held that the 1967 amendment only requires that judicial officers
consider danger to the community—the Legislature cannot “infringe
upon the constitutional right of bail.”88
By 2000, the use of third-party custodians was widespread;
however, there was little that a judge could do if someone acting as a
third party failed to report when the defendant violated his conditions
of release. In response to concerns that third-party custodians were not
taking their duties seriously, the legislature amended section
12.30.020(b)(1) of the Alaska Statutes to allow judicial officers to hold
third-party custodians in contempt of court for failing to report a
defendant’s violations.89 The amended statute read as follows:
(1) [P]lace the person in the custody of a designated person or
organization agreeing as a custodian to supervise the
person; the court shall, personally and in writing, inform
85. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(a) (1966) (emphasis added); see also Martin v.
State, 517 P.2d 1389, 1395 (Alaska 1974).
86. Martin, 517 P.2d. at 1396. Since 1967, the statute has again been amended,
and currently the relevant section reads: “(b) If a judicial officer determines
under (a) of this section that the release of a person will not reasonably assure
the appearance of the person, or will pose a danger to the alleged victim, other
persons, or the community, the judicial officer may . . . .” ALASKA STAT. §
12.30.020(b). Most states and the federal statute also include a provision that the
judicial officer setting bail should consider both the defendant’s appearance and
community safety. John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation
of Bail Reform, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15 (1985).
87. Martin, 517 P.2d at 1396.
88. Id. at 1397.
89. H.R. 368, 21st Leg., 2d Sess. § 4 (Alaska 2000) (bold text in original
document indicates the language adopted during the 21st Legislature).
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the custodian about the duties required of a custodian, and
that failure to report immediately in accordance with the
terms of the order that the person released has violated a
condition of release may result in the custodian’s being
held in contempt under AS 09.50.010. . . .90
Just four years after the legislature made it possible to hold a thirdparty custodian in contempt of court, it changed the statute again,
making failure to report a defendant’s violations a Class A misdemeanor
crime.91 A new section was also added to the statute requiring that
judicial officers issue written findings every time they require a
defendant be released to a third-party custodian, demonstrating why the
imposition of the third-party custodian requirement was necessary.92
When this new legislation was discussed by the legislature, it was
widely accepted among the House Judiciary Standing Committee that
the third-party custodian requirement was overused.93 This committee
discussed changing the statute more drastically, but no one had
proposals about how to do so and a major change to the statute was not

90. Id.
91. H.R. 244, 23d Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2004). If convicted on a misdemeanor
charge, the third-party custodian faces up to a $10,000 fine and up to a year in
prison. Representative Gara suggested this amendment as a small fix: “I think it
will minimize the number of sort of lazy third-party custodian orders that courts
issue. . . . I think this is not a perfect fix to the problem, [but] my understanding
from the [Alaska] Judicial Council is that they and the court system are going to
sit down and talk about the problems of third-party custody and over-ordering
of it, and I hope that discussion leads to maybe a long-term resolution.” Criminal
Law/Sentencing/Probation/Parole: Hearing on H.R. 244 Before the H. Judiciary
Standing Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 30 (Alaska 2004) (statement of Rep. Les Gara,
Member, House Judiciary Standing Comm.); see also Press Release from Gregg
Renkes, Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Law, State of Alaska, Third-Party Custodians
Face Prosecution Over Failure to Watch Criminal Defendants Left in their Care
(Aug. 30, 2004) (on file with author). This news release describes the first months
with the revised statute in place from the prosecutor’s perspective. Id.
Prosecutors in Anchorage filed five misdemeanor charges against third-party
custodians who allegedly failed to notify authorities when the defendant
violated conditions of release. Id.
92. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(i) (2008).
93. See Criminal Law/Sentencing/Probation/Parole: Hearing on H.R. 244 Before the
H. Judiciary Standing Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 31 (Alaska Mar. 30, 2004). In the
hearing, Chair McGuire “expressed curiosity about discovering why third-party
custodians are increasingly being required in addition to bail, even in
misdemeanor cases, and suggested that should be the problem that is focused
on.” Id. at 39. Similarly, “Representative Gara agreed that third-party custodians
are overused,” id. at 40, whereas “Representative Gruenberg said he’d like to see
both sides—prosecutors and defense attorneys—come up with some guidelines
regarding when a judge or magistrate is to appoint a third-party custodian.”
Criminal Law/Sentencing/Probation/Parole: Hearing on H.R. 244 Before the H.
Judiciary Standing Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 54 (Alaska Mar. 31, 2004).
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expected to pass during the session.94 Perhaps as a quick fix, the
legislature adopted a letter of intent that read:
The Alaska Legislature acknowledges the findings contained in
the Alaska Judicial Council’s study “Alaska Felony Process:
1999” that the use of third-party custodians was initially
intended to give indigent defendants an equal opportunity for
predisposition release, that this bail condition was one of the
most important influences on the length of time that
defendants spent incarcerated before disposition of their cases,
and that this bail condition has resulted in substantially longer
terms of predisposition incarceration in non-violent type cases.
Given the right to bail guaranteed by Article I, Section 11 of the
Alaska Constitution, it is the intent of the Legislature that
judicial officers more rigorously apply the framework set out in
A.S. 12.30.010-029 for pretrial release. It is the intent of the
Legislature that judicial officers will appoint third-party
custodians in a manner that will further the intent of the
statute.95
This is powerful language but carries little weight or concrete
alternatives for judicial officers.
B.

History of the Third-Party Custodian Requirement in Alaska

When talking to judges and practitioners, no one seems to know
exactly when judicial officers started regularly requiring that defendants
be released to third-party custodians.96 The requirement was originally
thought to be a replacement for monetary bail, and it began mainly in
rural Alaska.97 In fact, while most criminal attorneys in Anchorage
believe that the requirement does not work in the city,98 many think that

94. Criminal Law/Sentencing/Probation/Parole: Hearing on H.R. 244 Before the H.
Judiciary Standing Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 51–55 (Alaska Mar. 31, 2004).
95. Criminal Law/Sentencing/Probation/Parole: Hearing on H.R. 244 Before the H.
Judiciary Standing Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 30–31 (Alaska Apr. 7, 2004) (letter of
intent proposed and read by Rep. Max Gruenberg).
96. One judge who has been practicing law in Alaska since 1978 reports that
third-party custodians were widely used when that judge began practice.
Telephone Interview with a Superior Court Judge, Alaska Super. Ct. (Feb. 5,
2009).
97. Telephone Interview with a District Court Judge, Alaska Dist. Ct. (Feb. 3,
2009); Telephone Interview with a Superior Court Judge, Alaska Super. Ct. (Feb.
5, 2009); Telephone Interview with a District Attorney, State of Alaska (Feb. 29,
2009).
98. Telephone Interview with a District Attorney, State of Alaska (Feb. 29,
2009); Novak, supra note 6.
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it is much more effective in the rural communities.99 One judge posits
that the third-party custodian requirement works better in rural Alaska
because of the relative lack of commerce in those areas.100 This means
that defendants generally have less money to post bail, and third-party
custodians may be looked on as a favorable alternative.
Further, cultural differences may also indicate that the third-party
custodian requirement may be more useful in rural Alaska. Many
Alaska Native communities enjoy very strong family ties.101 These
family ties may often mean that third-party custodians can be very
effective in assuring that the defendant follows through with his or her
conditions of release. In fact, one district court judge in Anchorage
believes that third-party custodians, particularly in rural communities,
are used more to supervise release conditions than to assure appearance
and community safety.102 Such ties are less prevalent in the cities. In fact,
rumors abound of a black market for third-party custodians in
Anchorage.103 There is also simply a size-of-community difference that
greatly impacts the effectiveness of third-party custodians. In a small
community, neighbors know when a defendant is supposed to be with a
third-party custodian, and while there may only be one community
safety officer,104 he will know which defendants are supposed to be with
which custodians. One prosecutor sounded rather shocked, reporting
that he actually saw third-party custodians with defendants in the
grocery store in Dillingham.105 This was during his two year stint at the
99. Telephone Interview with a Superior Court Judge, Alaska Super. Ct.
(Feb. 5, 2009); Telephone Interview with a District Attorney, State of Alaska (Feb.
29, 2009); Ben Hofmeister, Anchorage District Attorney, Remarks at the Review
of Bail Reviews Public Forum (Sept. 16, 2008).
100. Telephone Interview with a Superior Court Judge, Alaska Super. Ct.
(Feb. 5, 2009); see also CHASE RIVELAND, ET AL., ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ASSESSMENT COMM’N, A PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ASSESSMENT COMM’N 32 (1999) (in a discussion of interview results, the authors
reported that the Department of Correction Spokesperson expressed a belief that
third-party custodian use has increased and is being used for less serious crimes,
and a superior court judge estimated that she requires third-party custodians for
about one-half of all the felony defendants for whom she sets bail).
101. Telephone Interview with a Superior Court Judge, Alaska Super. Ct.
(Feb. 5, 2009).
102. Telephone Interview with a District Court Judge, Alaska Dist. Ct. (Feb. 3,
2009).
103. Id.; Telephone Interview with a Superior Court Judge, Alaska Super. Ct.
(Feb. 5, 2009).
104. Public Safety Officers in Alaska fulfill a role similar to that of police
officers and are trained in crime prevention and basic law enforcement. See, e.g.,
Village Public Safety Officer Program, http://www.dps.state.ak.us/AST/vpso/
(last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
105. Telephone Interview with a District Attorney, State of Alaska (Feb. 29,
2009).
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Dillingham District Attorney’s office. Presumably he was jaded after
time in Anchorage, where it is widely believed that third-party
custodians often do not constantly stay with their assigned defendants
during the entire pretrial release period.106
C.

The Impact of the Third-Party Custodian Requirement

The Alaska Judicial Council has found the third-party custodian
requirement to be the most important factor in determining the length of
predisposition incarceration. This is likely because of the difficulty that
some people have in finding a suitable third party to act as a custodian.
When a defendant is required to have a third-party custodian, that
person must find a family member or a friend who is willing to remain
with them for twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.107 The rule
imposed is generally that the third-party custodian must be within sight
or sound of the defendant at all times.108 This is a huge commitment for
anyone, made even more burdensome by the fact that a third party
exposes himself to liability, as he could be charged with a misdemeanor
for failing to report a violation. While third-party custodian
responsibilities may sound straightforward, potential third parties may
fear the responsibility because of worry about making a mistake and
subsequently facing misdemeanor charges.109 Further, some defendants
are surrounded by people who also have criminal histories and simply
would not be approved as third-party custodians.110
106. Id.; Telephone Interview with a District Court Judge, Alaska Dist. Ct.
(Feb. 3, 2009).
107. Defendants can have multiple third-party custodians, at the judicial
officer’s discretion. The assignment of two custodians is fairly common, though
judges seem unwilling to allow more than three because of the confusion that
can arise about who is responsible for the defendant at what times. Telephone
Interview with a Superior Court Judge, Alaska Super. Ct. (Feb. 5, 2009).
Sometimes a single person has acted as a third-party custodian for multiple
defendants at the same time. Release of a Criminal Defendant: Hearing on H.R. 368
Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 21st Leg. Reg. Sess. 1750 (Alaska Feb. 25, 2000)
(comment by Lauree Hugonin, Director, Alaska Network on Domestic Violence
and Sexual Assault).
108. See Criminal Law/Sentencing/Probation/Parole: Hearing on H.R. 244 Before the
H. Judiciary Standing Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 31 (Alaska Mar. 30, 2004) (Thirdparty custodians “most often promise the judge to watch the person 24 hours a
day”).
109. Additionally, third-party custodians often have no past history of
violating the law and likely want to avoid the risk of potentially blemishing their
records if they fail to report misconduct by their assigned defendants.
110. Fueled in part by the presence of defendants who do not know anyone
who a judge would approve, it is widely believed that there is a market for
third-party custodians, which works to undermine the system in place. See, e.g.,
John Novak, Department of Labor, Remarks at the Review of Bail Reviews
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The fact that the third-party custodian requirement leads to longer
predisposition incarceration rates is important for a number of reasons.
First, incarcerating predisposition defendants represents an increased
expense for the State. When defendants remain incarcerated awaiting
trial, they require extra resources, including jail space and all other
incarceration costs, as well as the added cost of transportation to and
from the courthouse.111
Second, when a defendant is released, he has a greater ability to
help his attorney prepare for his case.112 The importance of this fact
cannot be underestimated—it has been found that defendants who are
detained pretrial are more likely to be found guilty and to receive a
harsher sentence than defendants in the same situation who are released
pretrial.113 When a defendant is incarcerated prior to trial it “interferes
with [his] ability to defend himself; it compromises his ability to work
and deprives his family of emotional and economic support.”114
Public Forum (Sept. 16, 2008) (“We’ve all heard stories about the defendant
meeting the [third-party custodian] at the courthouse steps.”); Telephone
Interview with a District Court Judge, Alaska Dist. Ct. (Feb. 3, 2009)
(acknowledging that there is probably third-party custodian trafficking, where
people are paid for their services as third parties).
111. See ALASKA FELONY PROCESS, supra note 1, at 157.
112. See MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 19, at 4 (“An incarcerated defendant
cannot look for friendly witnesses and, in some jurisdictions, is unlikely to have
much contact with a defense lawyer.”).
113. Id. at 5 (“Statistically, defendants detained prior to trial plead guilty
more often, are convicted more often, and are more likely to be sentenced to
prison than are defendants who are released prior to trial.”); Arthur R. Angel, et
al., Preventative Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289,
347 (1970) (“Several recent studies indicate that defendants incarcerated before
trial are more likely to be found guilty and committed to prison than those
released.”). These statistics are likely explained in part by the fact that higher
bail amounts and more restrictive bail conditions are required of defendants
who are more likely to be guilty. After all, one of the factors in the bail statute
that a judge must consider is the weight of evidence against the defendant.
However, detention itself may also contribute to the number of guilty pleas,
especially if a suitable third-party custodian cannot be obtained. See MAHONEY,
ET AL., supra note 19, at 4–5 (“Defendants held in detention often have a
heightened incentive to plead guilty, even though they may have a valid
defense, simply to gain their freedom—particularly if they can receive a sentence
of ‘time served’ or receive credit for their jail time against a relatively short jail or
prison sentence.”).
114. Rachel King, Criminal Defense in Rural Alaska, 15 ALASKA JUSTICE FORUM 5,
6 (1998); see also Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 198 (1960) (“Imprisoned, a
man may have no opportunity to investigate his case, to cooperate with his
counsel, [or] to earn money that is still necessary for the fullest use of his right to
appeal.”); Angel, et al., supra note 113, at 353 (“Any detention before trial
imposes severe economic disruption on the defendant, his family and the
community.”); MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 19, at 4 (“The defendant who
remains in jail may have difficulty participating in his or her own defense.”);
John Scalia, Bureau of Justice Statistician, FEDERAL PRETRIAL RELEASE AND
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Attorneys tend to be busy and often have difficulty visiting clients in
jail.115 In the main Anchorage jail there are only three visiting rooms and
limited visiting hours.116 Attorneys complain that it is not only hard to
find the time to get out to the jail, but when they get there, they might
face delays before they can even meet with their client because there are
limited visiting rooms available.117 There is also less privacy in prison,
making it more difficult for defense counsel to establish the trust
necessary for an effective attorney-client relationship.
Third, a defendant’s morale is diminished when he is incarcerated
and is unable to continue to care for his family or work in his
community.118 Finally, the presumption of innocence is deeply rooted in
our country’s history.119 When a defendant is denied release because he
cannot find someone able to watch him twenty-four hours a day, seven
days a week, he is forced to live as though he were already convicted.

DETENTION, 1996, at 5 (Feb. 1999) (writing that release “permits a defendant to
more fully assist in the preparation of a defense.”).
115. Particularly affected are attorneys with the Public Defender Agency who
face large, sometimes overwhelming, case loads. Eighty percent of defendants
studied by the Alaska Judicial Council qualified for court-appointed counsel.
CHASE RIVELAND, ET AL., ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASSESSMENT COMM’N, A
PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASSESSMENT COMM’N 25 (1999). The
Public Defender Act requires that counsel be appointed for any indigent person
who is charged with a serious crime. ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.100 (2008). An
“indigent person” is “[a] person who, at the time need is determined, does not
have sufficient assets, credit, or other means to provide for payment of an
attorney and all other necessary expenses of representation without depriving
the party or the party’s dependents of food, clothing, or shelter and who has not
disposed of any assets since the commission of the offense with the intent or for
the purpose of establishing eligibility for assistance under this chapter.” ALASKA
STAT. § 18.85.170(4); see also ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 39, 39.1 (procedures for courts to
appoint counsel and determine a defendant’s eligibility).
116. Telephone Interview with a District Attorney in Anchorage, Alaska (Feb.
29, 2009).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., King, supra note 114, at 6 (the author, a former employee with
the Alaska Public Defender Agency in a rural community, recounts from
personal experience that defendants are generally disadvantaged by pretrial
incarceration).
119. See MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 19, at 5 (noting that this “core value of
American society” means that when making pretrial release decisions “all
defendants should have the same opportunity for consideration for release
without invidious discrimination based on race, sex, or economic status”).
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

Assistance for the Decision Maker: An Introduction to Pretrial
Services Programs

The following recommendations are not simple. The problem
examined in the first part of this Note is also not simple, but larger
justice concerns are implicated. The use of third-party custodians is
supposed to ensure defendants’ equal protection. Its current form,
however, is working to stifle defendants’ rights. Third-party custodians
have become the norm for felony defendants in too many parts of
Alaska, and they are often required without considering the
consequences for defendants who cannot find a suitable third-party
custodian. Thus, an alternative means of protecting defendants’ rights is
required. Although reforming such a long-standing tradition is no easy
task, it provides an opportunity to examine the broader pretrial release
scheme in Alaskan communities. The proposal that follows is for Alaska
to start a pretrial services agency, which will give judges much more
information to make their initial bail determinations. These programs
exist in many other jurisdictions throughout the country, and the
information provided to judges has been shown to lead to more
defendants being released on their own recognizance with fewer
conditions imposed, while at the same time decreasing the number of
defendants failing to appear at their court dates. The proposal that
follows will still allow judicial officers to assign third-party custodians
when the defendant makes the request and has a suitable third party to
whom they would rather be released instead of remaining incarcerated.
Criminal defense attorneys, particularly public defenders with
heavy case loads, often have only a few minutes to talk to their client
before making a bail argument.120 Additionally, defense attorneys often
can only report what their clients tell them without the time or resources
to corroborate that information before repeating it to the judicial officer.
120. Many criminal defendants are issued citations to appear at their
arraignment at a later date, and they are not held in custody pending their
arraignment. Such situations are not included here and, in these cases, it is rare
for a district attorney to ask for bail conditions other than standard conditions,
such as requiring the defendant to appear at all future court dates. Because these
defendants are not in custody, pretrial services employees would not interview
them. Based on the Author’s personal experience in Anchorage and Juneau, once
a defendant is assigned to the Public Defender Agency, an argument must be
made almost immediately, with only moments to confer with the Agency’s new
client, or it may be postponed for twenty-four hours if the defense attorney
needs more time to talk to the client to make the strongest bail argument
possible.
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Similarly, prosecutors generally make bail arguments based solely on
the charging documents and the past criminal record of the accused. In
contrast, if the jurisdiction has a pretrial services office, then an
employee from the office (who is independent from both the
prosecution and the defense) will interview the defendant prior to the
bail arguments about the factors the judicial officer is required to
consider when making bail decisions.121 Ideally, the employee will also
have a chance to corroborate what the defendant tells him, by calling
family or friends, going to visit the defendant’s home, or even
interviewing potential third-party custodians.122 Because the pretrial
services office is not part of either side of the litigation, they will be able
to provide the judicial officer with unbiased evidence and a
recommendation that can be trusted.123
Current pretrial services offices vary in their structure and services.
Services range from conducting initial interviews of defendants, often
before they are assigned or have hired an attorney, to more extensive
interviews and information gathering that is used to prepare a report for

121. In Alaska these factors are enumerated in ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(c)
(2008). A judicial officer must consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including the
effect of the offense upon the alleged victim; (2) the weight of the
evidence against the person; (3) the person’s family ties; (4) the person’s
employment; (5) the person’s financial resources; (6) the person’s
character and mental condition; (7) the length of the person’s residence
in the community; (8) the person’s record of convictions; (9) the
person’s record of appearance at court proceedings; (10) the flight of
the accused to avoid prosecution or the person’s failure to appear at
court proceedings; and (11) threats the person has made, and the
danger the person poses, to the alleged victim.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(c)(1)–(11) (2008).
122. This aspect of the pretrial services office could be particularly useful to
judicial officers. Even if a defendant finds a suitable third-party custodian, it
does not mean that the person lives in a suitable place. A superior court judge
stated that he tries to question every potential third party about their living
situation, hoping to learn whether they live with people who he does not want
the defendant around. Telephone Interview with a Superior Court Judge, Alaska
Super. Ct. (Feb. 5, 2009). The judge spoke of one particular instance in which it
was clear that the third-party custodian lived in a house with drug dealers. Id.
123. In Anchorage, most initial bail hearings in district court are done by
interns (when the defendant requests and qualifies for a court-appointed
attorney), with the Public Defender Agency practicing under an intern practice
permit pursuant to ALASKA CT. BAR R. 44 (2008). In an interview with a long-term
District Court Judge, the judge expressed anguish with this system. Since interns
do not have the experience that senior attorneys do, interns often fail to make
best argument available, and fail to address many factors that a judge must
consider. Telephone Interview with a District Court Judge, Alaska Dist. Ct. (Feb.
3, 2009).
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the judicial officer.124 Certain agencies also supervise some of the
defendants who are released pretrial.125 Agencies have found “homes in
probation departments, court offices, and local jails and as independent
county contractors.”126 Sometimes recommendations are based on
objective criteria alone, while others include some level of subjective
decision making on the part of the pretrial services staff member.127
Some agencies have the capacity to monitor released defendants, while
others do not.128 Others simply provide phone calls prior to court
appearances.129 Most agencies also provide follow-up services if a
defendant fails to appear at a scheduled court date.130
B.

The Manhattan Bail Project

The use of pretrial services offices started with an experiment in
1961 called the Manhattan Bail Project.131 This three-year experiment
changed bail in this country, leading to the Federal Bail Reform Act of
1966132 and the establishment of Federal Pretrial Services Offices, and

124. California Ass’n of Pretrial Services, PRETRIAL SERVICES: A HISTORY,
http://pretrialservicesca.org/about_CAPS.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009)
[hereinafter CAPS].
125. Id.
126. John Clark & D. Alan Henry, Bureau of Justice Assistance, PRETRIAL
SERVICES PROGRAMMING AT THE START OF THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (July 2003).
127. Id. at vii.
128. See CAPS, supra note 124.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 19, at 8; Bernard Botein, The Manhattan
Bail Project: Its Impact on Criminology and the Criminal Law Processes, 43 TEXAS L.
REV. 319 (1965) (providing an in-depth discussion of the Manhattan Bail Project).
132. Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a). This legislation is widely
known as “the most significant legislation . . . in the bail reform effort[.]” WAYNE
H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 161 (1976). Change came about largely
because of growing concerns about the commercial bail bondsman industry
having too much power to exploit defendants and concerns that defendants
were being unfairly detained because they could not afford bail, John S.
Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3–4 (1985), and because studies proved that there were viable
ways to solve those issues. The most influential study in this regard is the
Manhattan Bail Project. Botein, supra note 131, at 326. When Congress passed the
Bail Reform Act of 1966, own recognizance release was made a priority for the
first time in history. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1346
(2006)). Further, if own recognizance release was deemed inappropriate, then
the judicial officer was directed to make a pretrial release decision selecting the
least restrictive means possible to ensure the defendant’s future appearance at
scheduled court hearings. Id. Finally, statutorily defined conditions of release
included not only financial bail, but a number of non-financial conditions,
including the third-party custodian condition. Id.
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state, county, and city pretrial services offices across the country.133 The
Vera Foundation started the Manhattan Bail Project exclusively to study
bail in Manhattan.134 The Vera Foundation partnered with the New York
University School of Law and the Institute of Judicial Administration to
start a three-year project.135 Their goal was to test the hypothesis that
“more persons can successfully be released on [bail] if verified
information concerning their character and roots in the community is
available to the court at the time of bail determination.”136
To test this hypothesis, evening students at the New York
University School of Law spent their mornings interviewing defendants
being held in detention rooms before their bail hearings in Part 1A of the
Criminal Court of the Borough of Manhattan.137 Students interviewed all
defendants except those “charged with, or having a previous record of,
narcotics offenses, homicide, forcible rape, sodomy involving a minor,
corrupting the morals of a child, carnal abuse, and assault on a police
officer . . . because of the special problems they pose.”138 After an initial
set of questions, students decided whether there was a good chance the
defendant would be recommended for release on his or her own
recognizance.139 If so, then the defendant was interviewed in more
depth, and the student attempted to verify information provided by the
defendant.140 This process lasted about an hour.141 After gathering
information about the defendant, the student weighed a number of
different factors and decided whether or not to recommend him or her
to the judge for release in exchange for a promise to appear in court.142
The purpose of bail is to assure defendants’ future appearance in
court.143 The students calculated the number of defendants who failed to
appear at their court hearings to determine the project’s success.144 The
factors that the students used to decide whether to recommend
133. MAHONEY, supra note 19, at 8–9 (at the time of this 2000 publication,
ninety-four federal districts operated pretrial services programs, and there were
offices in over 300 counties).
134. Botein, supra note 131, at 326.
135. See Charles E. Ares, Anne Rankin & Herbert Sturz, The Manhattan Bail
Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pretrial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 71–72
(1963).
136. Id. at 68.
137. Id. at 72.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 74.
140. Id. at 72–73.
141. Botein, supra note 131, at 327.
142. Ares, et al., supra note 135, at 67.
143. Id. at 68. In 1984, Congress amended federal bail laws to require that bail
also be set to ensure the safety of the community. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. § 3142 (1988).
144. Ares, et al., supra note 135, at 72.
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defendants for release on their own recognizance included ties to the
community, such as employment, proximity of the defendant’s family,
length of local residence, and whether someone agreed to help the
defendant get to court.145 They also considered the penalty for the
present charge and the defendant’s prior record. 146
Information gathered was sent to the arraignment court for half of
the defendants.147 The other half served as a control group.148 From
October 16, 1961 to April 8, 1964, 13,000 defendants were detained in
Part 1A of the Criminal Court of the Borough of Manhattan.149 Of these,
3000 were excluded from the interview process because of their current
charge or previous record.150 Of the 10,000 interviewed for the project,
4000 were recommended for release on their own recognizance.151 The
court granted own recognizance release to 2195 of these individuals.152
Only fifteen of these failed to show up, or about one-half of one
percent.153
Over the course of the project, staff members grew increasingly
more comfortable recommending people for own recognizance release,
stemming from the success their recommendations were having. At the
beginning, staff members recommended 28% of defendants for their
own recognizance release.154 This gradually increased to 65% by the end
of the project.155 Perhaps even more importantly, throughout the course
of the project, prosecutors initially agreed with the Project
recommendations only about 50% of the time, but this increased to
about 80% of the time by the end of the project.156
The Project “demonstrated that judges would release more
defendants on their own recognizance if they had information regarding
defendants’ housing arrangements, family ties, and employment,”157
rather than the traditional snippets of unverified information from a
defense attorney, information about the charge, and the defendant’s
criminal record. State and city governments responded to the success of
the Manhattan Bail Project by starting their own bail projects.158 The
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 74.
Id.
Botein, supra note 131, at 327.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 19, at 8.
See CAPS, supra note 124.
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Speedy Trial Act of 1974 “created 10 pilot pretrial services agencies in
the Federal Courts . . . designed to provide judges with the information
necessary to make conditional release decisions.”159 This pilot project
proved highly successful,160 and in 1982, Congress established pretrial
services agencies in all federal district courts except Washington, D.C.161
Additionally, as of 2001, 300 local jurisdictions had established pretrial
services programs.162 “While individual pretrial service[s] offices vary in
their policies, and philosophies, their common goals are: (1) to prepare
objective, concise, and thorough pretrial services reports, (2) to reduce
unnecessary detention and crime committed while on bail, and (3) to
provide effective supervision for individuals while on pretrial
release.”163
C.

The Viability of a Pretrial Services Program in Alaska

Creating a pretrial services office is a viable option for the Alaskan
criminal justice system. Judicial officers need more information than
they currently receive to make good predisposition release decisions. It
is well-documented that judicial officers with more information are
more likely to release a defendant on their own recognizance, or at least
to impose fewer conditions of release.164 While Representative
159. MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 19, at 6.
160. See id. “In the early 1980s, when Congress was considering expansion of
pretrial services into all Federal courts, Federal magistrates testified that neither
defense lawyers nor prosecutors were able to provide them with the requisite
information for an informed bail decision.” Id. In the words of Judge Gerald B.
Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit: “[T]he administration of justice is far better
served when a magistrate or judge setting conditions of bail under the Bail
Reform Act of 1966 has sufficient accurate and objective information regarding
the defendant, his background, the offense and all other evidence that relates to
the question of whether he will appear for trial. The system is far better served
when the judge can make an informed decision, and pretrial services has made a
major step in this direction.” Extend the Operations of the Pretrial Services Agencies:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong. 12 (1981) (statement of Gerald Tjoflat, judge in the Eleventh Circuit).
161. See, e.g., Thomas Bak, Pretrial Detention in the Ninth Circuit, 35 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 993, 995 (1998). The common name for this legislation is the “Pretrial
Services Act of 1982.” Id. The Act was also the first piece of federal legislation
that “required dangerousness to be a factor considered for pretrial inquiry. . . .”
Betsy Wanger, Limiting Preventive Detention Through Conditional Release: The
Unfulfilled Promise of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, 97 YALE L.J. 320, 329 (1987).
However, the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 expanded the consideration of
dangerousness as a factor considered in pretrial release decisions in federal
courts.
162. MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 19, at iii.
163. Bak, supra note 161, at 996.
164. See, e.g., MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 19, at 3 (“As pretrial services
programs have evolved since the 1960s, they have increasingly demonstrated
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Gruenberg said in the House Judiciary Committee on March 31, 2004
that “[w]e need more guidance in the statute,”165 the guidance is already
there. Judicial officers are, by statute, supposed to impose the least
restrictive conditions necessary when setting bail. Yet, the imposition of
a third-party custodian, perhaps the most restrictive bail condition, is
required much of the time.166 With more reliable, unbiased information
about the accused, judicial officers will have the proper tools and
necessary encouragement to follow the statute.
The Alaska Criminal Justice Assessment Commission reports that
the information systems used in Alaska’s criminal justice system “are
inadequate, inflexible, difficult to use, and isolated from one another.
Data are frequently not trusted and therefore not used. Because they are
not used, their quality is not controlled . . . .”167 Establishing pretrial
services offices throughout the state will help provide more information
to judicial officers. A carefully designed program can lead to an increase
in the number of defendants released on their own recognizance, while
also decreasing failure-to-appear rates through simple monitoring
programs and managing the risk that a defendant released pretrial will
commit a violent crime.168 Some judicial officers in Alaska are already
familiar with these services and believe that the services would help
them make better decisions.169
Once information is gathered for a pretrial release decision, most
pretrial services agencies analyze the information to determine a risk
classification or risk assessment of the defendant.170 This assessment
focuses on whether the particular defendant poses a risk of either

their capacity to provide information about defendants and about available
supervised release options that is relevant to assessing both the risk of flight and
the risk to public safety. In some jurisdictions, programs have also developed a
capacity to supervise defendants and to help minimize both types of risk.”).
165. H.B. 244, 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 54 (Alaska 2004) (statement of Rep. Les Gara).
166. See infra, Part I.B.
167. RIVELAND ET AL., supra note 100, at 68. The Commission also found that
APSIN (the main criminal history database in Alaska) “has an unacceptably high
rate of missing or inaccurate data.” Id. at 66. But see id. at 66–68 for a more
thorough description of the information systems used in Alaska and
improvements that have been made since 1993.
168. See MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 19, at 39–40. In response to high failureto-appear rates, the San Mateo, California Pretrial Services Program changed
their procedures, which “led to immediate and dramatic improvements.” Id. at
39. The director of that program said that after the change in procedure there
was “a significant decrease in the failure to appear rate and subsequent
incarceration of defendants on bench warrants.” Id.
169. Telephone Interview with a Superior Court Judge, Alaska Super. Ct.
(Feb. 5, 2009).
170. John Clark & D. Alan Henry, Bureau of Justice Assistance, PRETRIAL
SERVICES PROGRAMMING AT THE START OF THE 21ST CENTURY 31 (July 2003).
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willfully failing to appear in court or presenting a danger to the
community.171 Agencies employ both subjective assessments and the use
of objective criteria, such as point systems, to make recommendations.172
Different criteria may lead to more accurate results in different
jurisdictions, and thus each pretrial services agency is encouraged to
“develop its own risk assessment instrument based on local research
related to risks in the jurisdiction.”173 A recommendation for this process
in Alaska is outside the scope of this Note; however, it should be noted
that the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies “maintains
that use of objective criteria is ‘the only way to remove arbitrariness and
approach equal treatment for all defendants.’”174

CONCLUSION
In the 1960s, Alaska adopted bail laws similar to those in the
federal government and many other states. The laws create a
presumption that defendants charged with a crime will be released from
jail on their own recognizance. However, if the judicial officer thinks
that the defendant is either a flight risk or a danger to the community,
then the judicial officer can impose conditions of release to the extent
necessary to ensure appearance and community safety. Despite this
presumption of using the least restrictive means to ensure appearance
and safety, judicial officers throughout Alaska require that defendants
be released to a third-party custodian in most felony cases.175 This is an
extremely onerous requirement and often means that the defendant will
spend more time incarcerated, that he might have a more difficult time
presenting his defense, and that he is thus more likely to be convicted
and to receive a longer sentence than if he spent less time incarcerated
pretrial. While the third-party custodian requirement has its roots in
equal protection, it is no longer serving this goal. The requirement was
originally designed to allow indigent defendants to be released without
monetary bail, since they could not afford to pay, but its currently
widespread use indicates that it no longer serves merely this narrow
purpose. This is especially evident given that most defendants with a
third-party custodian requirement also have to post significant
monetary bail. The requirement is now being used by judicial officers to
provide an added assurance that the defendant’s conditions of release
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 15.
See id. (citing NATIONAL ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES (NAPSA),
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE, Standard XI (1978)).
175. ALASKA FELONY PROCESS, supra note 1, at 116 fig.24.
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are being monitored. The root of this problem lies partially in the
insufficient information presented to the judicial officer when he must
make a bail decision. To provide more reliable information to decision
makers, to prevent defendants from being subjected to unnecessarily
onerous bail requirements, and to ensure defendants’ equal protection
while still protecting the community, Alaska should develop an
independent pretrial services agency. While this program may be
expensive, this expense will be offset at least in part by the money saved
through lower predisposition incarceration rates. Further, the
community should feel comforted knowing that important bail decisions
are being made with better, more reliable information provided by an
independent agency.

